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Focused Discussion Invited Paper
A Fond Farewell to “Approximate Truth”?*
P. Kyle Stanford†
Rather than making a prediction for the future of the scientific realism
debate, I would like to propose a substantial revision of the way that debate
is presently conducted. Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is
characterized as dividing those who do and those who do not think that
the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific
theories indicate with high probability that those theories are “approximately
true.” But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has
far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences
between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realists,
but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points
of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who
instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such
realism is untenable in either form.
In earlier iterations of the debate, the language of approximate
truth played a crucial role in protecting scientific realism from invidious
oversimplification. Scientific realists never meant to claim, of course, that
even the most successful contemporary scientific theories were correct in
every detail or in every assertion they made. The attribution of merely
approximate truth recognized that even our best theories are surely wrong
in some of their details and that many further surprises, corrections, and
unexpected discoveries still remain in store. But those whom I have recently
(Stanford 2015) called classical or “Catastrophist” scientific realists insist
no less clearly that the most important, central, and fundamental claims
of our best scientific theories simply describe how things actually stand
in otherwise inaccessible domains of nature and that we should therefore
expect those claims to be validated by and to persist in some recognizable
form throughout the course of all further scientific inquiry. That is, such
Catastrophist realists deny that the most successful contemporary scientific
theories will ultimately share the same fates as successful predecessors like
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classical mechanics, the caloric theory of heat, phlogistic chemistry, the wave
theory of light, and many other examples in which central, important, and/or
fundamental claims of successful scientific theories were indeed overturned
in the course of further inquiry.
Of course, accumulating historical evidence has made it increasingly
difficult to argue that there are any fundamental or categorical differences
between the sorts of empirical and practical successes achieved by past
scientific theories and those of the present day. Accordingly, many
latter-day scientific realists have come to reject the Catastrophist realist’s
exceptionalism concerning contemporary scientific theories, allowing instead
that the future of science will be characterized by conceptual revolutions
and theoretical transformations just as profound as those that characterize
its past, and that many of even the most central and fundamental claims
of contemporary theoretical orthodoxy will ultimately be overturned as
scientific inquiry continues. But such “Uniformitarian” scientific realists
do not see this concession as undermining the claim that those same
theories are nonetheless “approximately true. ” After all, there are many
substantial points of continuity, overlap, structural similarity, and other
detailed relationships between successful past scientific theories and those of
the present day. Uniformitarian realists suggest that there will be similarly
substantive continuity and points of connection between our own theories
and their historical successors that reflect some systematic connection or
relationship between the conceptual apparatus of those theories and how
things actually stand in the otherwise inaccessible domains of nature they
seek to describe, even if many of their central and fundamental claims
are nonetheless ultimately overturned. Indeed, most Uniformitarian realists
go on to argue that the historical evidence itself puts us in a position to
actually identify the particular parts, claims, or features of our own scientific
theories that are responsible for their successes and should therefore be
expected to persist throughout the course of further inquiry, whether these
are thought to be the theory’s claims about the “structure” of nature (Worrall
1989), its “working posits” (Kitcher 1993), its “core causal descriptions” of
hypothesized entities (Psillos 1999), or something else altogether.
It would seem, then, that Catastrophist and Uniformitarian scientific
realists are united in attributing “approximate truth” to our best scientific
theories only because they have sharply diverging substantive conceptions of
what such approximate truth requires or involves. To see just how divergent
these conceptions of approximate truth really are, notice that Catastrophists
contrast the approximate truth they attribute to contemporary theories with
the fates of past theories like classical mechanics or the caloric theory of heat,
while those very same past successful theories serve as paradigmatic examples
of the much weaker Uniformitarian conception of approximate truth.
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Framing the debate as one that concerns the approximate truth of
our best scientific theories not only disguises these profound differences
between Catastrophist and Uniformitarian realists, but also obscures the
most important points of genuine disagreement between such realists and
those who believe instead that the historical record shows scientific realism
to be untenable in either form. Contemporary historicist critics of scientific
realism do not argue that there will be no important points of continuity
or systematic connections either between contemporary scientific theories
and their successors or between those theories and the otherwise inaccessible
natural domains they seek to describe. Their claim is simply that we should
nonetheless expect many of even the most central and fundamental claims
of contemporary scientific theories to be abandoned in the course of further
inquiry (just as they were in the case of many successful past theories), and
this claim is one that at least Uniformitarian realists seem happy to accept.
Such critics diverge from Uniformitarian realists, however, in rejecting the
further claim that the available evidence puts us in a position to reliably
specify just which parts, claims, or features of our best theories accurately
describe the world and should therefore be expected to persist in some
recognizable form throughout the course of further scientific inquiry. Such
historicist critics of scientific realism do not expect us to be any more
successful than scientists of the past have turned out to be in predicting which
parts, claims, or features of their own theories accurately capture how things
actually stand in the otherwise inaccessible domains of nature they seek to
describe or the important points of continuity and systematic relationships
that will hold between their own theories and those still to come.
My plea, then, is that we simply stop thinking, talking, and writing
about the scientific realism debate as being concerned with the approximate
truth of our best scientific theories. What actually divides the various
parties in today’s scientific realism dispute is not whether they embrace
the polysemous verbal formula that our best scientific theories are at least
approximately true, but instead their competing commitments regarding
the extent, form, and predictability of the theoretical continuity we should
expect between contemporary scientific theories and those that will be
embraced by future scientists and scientific communities. Catastrophist
scientific realists doubt that the future of science will include further profound
theoretical and conceptual revolutions of the sort that characterize much of
its past. Uniformitarian realists concede that it will, but insist that we are
nonetheless in a position to pick out the particular parts, claims, or features
of our own scientific theories that are responsible for their successes and
will therefore survive indefinitely throughout such further theoretical and
conceptual revolutions. And historicist opponents of scientific realism think
not only that the future of science will be characterized by such further
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transformations and revolutions, but also that we ourselves are simply not
in a position to reliably or justifiably predict which parts, claims, or features
of our best scientific theories are responsible for their successes and will
therefore be recognizably preserved throughout the course of all further
inquiry. None of these disagreements seem especially well characterized as
concerning whether our most successful contemporary scientific theories are
or are not “approximately true.”
P. Kyle Stanford
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science
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